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ABSTRACT
ΑN AUTOMATA-BASED AUTOMATIC VERIFICATION ENVIRONMENT
by
Vi Meng
With the continuing growth of computer systems including safety-critical computer control
systems, the need for reliable tools to help construct, analyze, and verify such systems also
continues to grow. The basic motivation of this work is to build such a formal verification
environment for computer-based systems.
An example of such a tool is the Design Oriented Verification and Evaluation
(DOVE) created by Australian Defense Science and Technology Organization. One of
the advantages of DOVE is that it combines ease of use provided by a graphical user
interface for describing specifications in the form of extended state machines with the rigor
of proving linear temporal logic properties in a robust theorem prover, Isabelle which was
developed at Cambridge University, UK, and TU Munich, Germany. Α different class of
examples is that of model checkers, such as SPIN and SMV. In this work, we describe
our technique to increase the utility of DOVE by extending it with the capability to build
systems by specifying components. This added utility is demonstrated with a concrete
example from a real project to study aspects of the control unit for an infusion pump being
built at the Walter Reid Army Institute of Research. Secondly, we provide a formulation of
linear temporal logic (LTL) in the theorem prover Isabelle. Next, we present a formalization
of a variation of the algorithm for translating LTL into Bϋchi automata. The original
translation algorithm is presented in Gerth et al and is the basis of model checkers such as
SPIN. We also provide a formal proof of the termination and correctness of this algorithm.
All definitions and proofs have been done fully formally within the generic theorem prover
Isabelle, which guarantees the rigor of our work and the reliability of the results obtained.
Finally, we introduce the automata theoretic framework for automatic verification as our
future works.
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This chapter provides an overview of this dissertation. We start with the motivation of our
work and proceed with presenting the main goal and desired results. It is followed by a
description of the outline of subsequent chapters.
1.1 Motivation
During the past two decades, the importance of computer-based systems has been growing
enormously. Computer-based systems are everywhere; airplanes, medical equipment,
banks, and so on, are all computerized. The reliability of such systems has become a big
issue in computer science. With the growth of their scale and functionality, the probability
to introduce design faults increases. Design faults can lead to expensive system errors.
Design faults of computerized systems can cause loss of time, money, or sometimes human
life. Thus, there is a clear need for reliable tools which can analyze the design of the
complicated computer systems for logical errors.
A major goal of software engineering is to enable developers to create high quality
systems. There are many approaches which aim to remove mistakes from software
development; one of the most promising one is formal methods [ 1, 2, 3, 4] . Formal methods
offer rigorous ways to model, design, and analyze systems by using specification and
verification techniques based on mathematical formalisms, such as logic [5], automata [6]
and graph theory [7]. By applying formal methods, we could reduce the number of
errors and hence be more confident that our systems do what they are supposed to do.
However, formal methods are not widely used mainly because of lack of user-friendly
and powerful tools. Such tools should be able to increase system quality and reliability
and simultaneously raising productivity. With these tools, all persons involved in a
1
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software project should be able to do operations like developing and entering specifications,
debugging, checking consistency, refinement, verification and validation, simulation and
testing.
Two well-developed approaches to formal verification are model checking [8, 9, 10]
and theorem proving. Model checking is a model-based verification method. That means,
it's a technique to build a finite model of a system and check some desired properties hold
in that model. Proving the correctness of the system is thus performed as an exhaustive
state space search. Model checking is guaranteed to terminate since the model is finite.
There are two major paradigms to model checking. The first one is to give system
specifications in a temporal logic and describe the system as an extended state transition
system. Model checking is performed as a check of whether the given extended state
transition system is a model for the specification. The second way is to use automata to
describe both the system itself and system specification. Model checking is performed
by comparing the two automata to determine whether or not the system conforms to its
specification.
The advantage of model checking [11] over interactive theorem proving is that it
is largely automatic. It only require the user's effort in modeling the system, stating
the specification, and deciding what abstraction is needed, if any. Compared to other
verification methods, the user's part is rather small. Model checking provides useful
counterexamples when certain properties fail to hold. These counterexamples can be used
for system debugging. The main limitations of model checking are the state explosion
problems and the limited expressive power of the various temporal logics used in model
checking. Usually, model checking tools are restricted to finite-state systems with relatively
small state spaces. There are several strategies that attempt to reduce this problem, such
as use of Binary Decision Diagrams(BDD) [12, 13], Partial Order Reduction [14, 15],
Symmetry [ 16], Abstraction [ 17], and so on. In Chapter 3, we will present our attempt [ 18]
to reduce the state explosion problem via the introduction of modular reasoning. Prominent
3
model checking systems are, MV [ 19], SPIN [20], STOP [21], Maude [22], and Murphy
[23], etc.
Theorem proving is a technique where both the system and its desired properties are
expressed as formulas in some mathematical logic. It is the process of finding a proof of
a property from the axioms or rules of the logic. Although proofs can be constructed by
hand, we will only focus on machine-assisted theorem proving.
In contrast to model checking, theorem proving can deal directly with infinite
domains by using techniques like structural induction. Theorem proving can be done
either automatically or interactively with users. Recently, interactive theorem provers
based on higher-order logic have become more mature. The most popular theorem proving
verification tools are HOLD [24], Isabelle [25, 26], PVS [27, 28], and ACLU [29]. In our
works, we choose Isabelle as our platform because Isabelle is more generic, flexible and
more highly developed automation than HOLD and PVS. However, theorem proving is a
highly time consuming process and usually requires a great deal of expertise. Theorem
proving is a much slower process than model checking.
Model checkers and theorem provers can be used to classify different sources of
failure and perform the checks for logical faults in the system design, where the design fails
to guarantee the user requirements. Both model checking and theorem proving have their
advantages and their weaknesses [30, 31]. Therefore, we propose as a long-term project to
combine the complementary technologies of model checking and theorem proving methods
in some degree to benefit from the advantage of both techniques. This thesis presents the
first major steps in this project.
Our work is mainly motivated by the paucity of high quality, user friendly tools
for the formal verification of computer-based systems. The main goal of our work is to
improve the quality of certain tools used to preform the checks for design errors. We
improved the functionality of DOVE by adding the ability to compose Extended State
Machines as the product of constituent ESNs, after having preformed the theoretical work
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to assure that it was a logically sound extension. We extended the class of problems that
can be handled by model checkers to include properties that distinguish between finite and
infinte behaviors. We improved the level of confidence that can be placed in LTL-based
model checkers using the LTL to Bϋchi automata translation algorithm, by having given
a rigorous proof of the algorithm underlying them. We use the theorem prover Isabelle,
which is a state-of-the-art interactive theorem prover for higher-order logic. Higher-order
logic theorem provers incorporate much automation, but at their core must be interactive,
because of the undecidability of higher-order logic.
1.2 Overview of the Dissertation
Chapter 2 presents some preliminary background from mathematics and some tools used
in our work. We start with an introduction to set theory, relations and functions. We
interpret linear temporal logic (LTL) [32] on both finite and infinite sequences. Behavior,
which is a disjoint sum of non-empty lists over an arbitrary type α and mapping functions
from the natural numbers to c, is defined to contain both finite and infinite sequences. Α
variant of Bϋchi automata [33] that is slightly different from traditional Bϋchi automata is
introduced with the ability to accept both finite and infinite words. The new Bϋchi automata
have separate accepting conditions for finite and infinite words. Two verification tools we
used in this work are also briefly described. Design Oriented Verification and Evaluation
(DOVE) [34] is a modeling and verification tool based on state machines. Isabelle [25]
is a generic theorem proving environment developed at Cambridge University and BTU
Munich. It allows us to express mathematical formulae in a formal language and prove
these formulae in a logical calculus.
Chapter 3 is a concise description of our approaches. We start with system modeling
and verification using DOVE and a method to address the state explosion problem in
DOVE. Then we introduce the formulation of LTL into Isabelle. Α variant of a widely
used model checking algorithm [35] for translating LTL formulae into Bϋchi automata is
5
also formulated in Isabelle. The termination and correctness proofs of the algorithm are
formally presented.
Chapter 4 concludes with a summary and pointers to further work and gives the
evaluation of our work; the advantages and weaknesses of our work are also given. We




Software verification methods are based on mathematical principles [36, 37]. Thus, it is
necessary to introduce some mathematical material before we start our techniques. In this
chapter, we focused on the mathematical foundations of our work. We present the basic
concepts and theories that are used later in this thesis. Two modeling and verification tools,
DOVE and Isabelle, will be introduced briefly.
2.1 Preliminaries
2.1.1 Sets, Functions and Relations
Set theory [38, 39, 40] is one of the most important and fundamental concepts in modern
mathematics. It provides the basic language in which much other mathematics is expressed.
Set theory also plays a principle role in formal methods.
A set is a finite or infinite well-defined collection of objects. Sets in our work are
typed [41, 42]. Every element in a set has the same type. Traditionally, finite sets can be
defined by explicitly listing its elements between curly braces, e.g. { 1, 3, 5, 6}. Another
notation for sets is to give some restriction on the possible values of its elements, e.g. {x
x<8}. Two sets are equal if they have same elements.
A finite set is a set containing a finite number of elements. The cardinality of a finite
set Α is the number of elements it contains, denoted by Ι Α . A infinite set is a set containing
an infinite number of elements, e.g. the set of all natural numbers. One special set is the
empty set, denoted Ο, that does not contain any element. The cardinally of the empty set
is 0. The empty set seems trivial, but it is a very important element in set theory.
6
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If a set Α contains an element x, we say x is belong to the set A, i.e. x Ε A. If x is
not an element of the set A, then x does not belong to set A, i.e. x Α. So, for example,
If every element in the set Α it is also an element of the set B, then Α is said to be
a subset of B, written Α C B. From the definition of the subset, we know that Α = B if
and only if A C B and B C A. If Α is a subset of B and Α B, then Α is a proper subset
of B, written Α C B. For example, if Α = {1, 3, 5, 6} and B = {1, 5, 6}, then we have
B C A. In fact, we also have B C Α because B Α. Notice that, for all sets A, ί C Α
and Α C Α.
Several operations to construct new sets can be performed on existing sets. The
intersection of two sets Α and B, written as Α Π B, is the set that consists all elements
occurring in both sets. For example, if A = {1, 3, 5, 6} and B = {1, 5, 6}, then Α Π B =
{1, 5, 6}. If two sets do not share any elements, then their intersection is empty and Α and
B are said to be disjoint. Some basic properties of intersections are, Α Π B = B Π A,
The union of two sets Α and B, denoted by AU B, is the set that contains all elements
occurring in either set. For example, if A = {1, 3, 5, 6} and B = {4, 7, 8}, then A U B =
{1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8}. Some basic properties of union are,
The difference of two sets A and B, denoted by Α — B, is the set that contains
all elements occurring in set A but not in set B. For example, if Α = {1, 3, 5, 6} and
The power set of a set A, denoted Powered), is the
set of all subsets of A, including Α itself. For example, Power]
An ordered pair is a collection of two elements such that one can be distinguished
as the first element and the other as the second element. Two ordered pairs are equal
if and only if their first elements are equal and their second elements are also equal. The
Cartesian product of two sets Α and B, denoted by Ax B, is the set of ordered pairs whose
first element is an member of Α and whose second element is an member of B. For example,
if A = {Κο , a 1 } and Β = {b0 , b 1 }, then A x Β = {(aο , b0 ), (aο , b 1 ), (a1, b0 ), (a1, b 1 )}. We
can extend the definition of Cartesian product more generally to sets of ordered n-tuples
for any positive integer n by repeatly apply Cartesian product for two sets.
Α relation of arity n is a set of n-tuples over a collection of domains. Each n-tuple
contains exactly n ordered elements. Α binary relation is a special case of relation where
n is set to be 2. Α binary relation is a set of ordered pairs. The well-known relation "<" is
an example of a binary relation.
The converse of a relation R, denoted by R-1 ,
The composition operator o of two relations is define  ,
The transitive closure of a binary relation R, written as R*, is defined
as follows: if there exists a sequence zο , ... , zn such that (zi , zZ+ι ) Ε R for Ο < i < n, with
zo = x and zn = y , then we say (x, y) Ε R*.
Α function of arity n can be defined as a relation of arity n + 1, where the first n
elements uniquely determines the value of the (n + 1)st elements. The terms "function" and
"mapping" are usually used synonymously. The set of input values of a function f is called
the domain of f, and the set of possible output values, is called the codomain. The image
of f is the set of all actual outputs. Notice that the codomain and image are distinguished
by possible and actual values.
Α function can be injective, surjective and bijective. A function f is said to be
injective (one-to-one) if and only if for two members x 1 and x2 in the domain of f, f (x 1 ) _
A function f is surjective (onto) if and only if for each element y in
the codomain of f, there exists an element x in the domain of f such that
function is said to be bijective if and only if it is both injective and surjective.
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2.1.2 Behavior
In this section, we introduce an approach behavior for presenting both finite and infinite
sequences. Α similar data structure is mentioned previously by Chou and Peled [14].
Behavior will later be used as a sequence on which to interpret LTL. 	
Behavior is the theory of a new type (α)behavior, which is defined as the disjoint
sum of finite non-empty lists ((α)nelist) over an arbitrary type α and functions of type
(flat ct), where nat is the domain of natural numbers and α is a codomain of arbitrary
type, FinBe and InfBe are constructors for the disjoint union:
The reason for having a unified type of both finite and infinite sequences is that some
system behaviors can be either finite or infinite, depending on the context, and some system
operations are more easily defined on behavior than they could be on other types.
The type of non-empty lists over a given type has already been defined in Isabelle and
used by the DOVE system to interpret LTL [34,43]. Elements of the type of non-empty lists
are either singleton elements from the underlying type, or sequences formed by adjoining
a new element to the head of an existing non-empty list.
Some basic operations to manipulate nelist are listed in Table
We also need some basic operations to manipulate behavior. The types and





The successor function Suc takes a natural number n and returns the natural number
n + 1. The function the takes a variable of option type and returns the value of the variable,
if there is one, and returns an unknown element of the correct type otherwise. In total,
about 25 functions are defined and 68 theorems are proved in the theorem prover Isabelle
on behavior. We do not list them all here because of the space constraints. Some examples
of principle rules about behavior are given as follow in Table 2.4. We do not provide the
proof for these theorems also because of the space constraints.
2.1.3 Linear Temporal Logic
Linear Temporal Logic(LTL), introduced by Pnueli in 1977 [32, 44, 45], is one of the most
popular specification formalisms for reasoning about reactive and concurrent systems. LTL
is now commonly used in the area of formal verification, particularly in conjunction with
model checking. It is often used to specify properties of interleaving sequences, and model
the executions of a program. In this work, LTL is defined on top of propositional logic.
Given a propositional logic P, the syntax of LTL is as follows:
The first line in the semantics definition states that a formula from the propositional
logic is interpreted in the first state of the behavior. The next three lines are the
interpretations of Boolean operators negation, conjunction, and disjunction.
The operator Q is called next. The formula Ο holds in a behavior σ when σ is not
a singleton and the suffix of σ starting from the second member satisfies φ. The operator
Qφ, called weaknext, is a weak version of Οφ. Where Qcφ means there is a next state
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and the suffix starting from the next state satisfies φ , Εφ means either there is no next
state, or the suffix starting from the next state satisfies φ. Notice we have that
The operator U is called until. The formula U ψ holds when φ holds until
some point where ψ holds. The operator eventually is a special case of until, i.e.,
Οφ = true U φ. The operator V is called release. The formula V ψ holds in a behavior
σ if either ψ holds for all suffixes of σ, or ψ holds until some suffix of σ where both φ and
hold. always is a special case of release, i.e., ❑φ = false V φ. Also, ψ = ψ if and
only if for all σ, σ 	 φ if and only if σ = ψ. A recursive equations about U is useful for
The formula Οφ eventually holds in a behavior σ if there is a suffix of σ where φ
holds. The formula ❑ gyp always holds in a behavior σ when all the suffixes of σ satisfy
φ . The operators eventually and always may be treated as syntactic sugar, or equally well
as derived constructs, using the until (U) and release (V) operators and the equivalences
In a similar fashion, we may eliminate all applications of negation except to the base
propositions. That is, we may consider all formulae to be in negation normal form, and
negation of general formulae to be a derived construct, defined using the LPL equivalences
2.1.4 Bauchi Automata
Automata theory [6] is widely used in many fields in computer science. It has been
successfully applied into the domain of specification and verification of computer systems.
Finite automata are basically state machines over finite transition systems. Finite
automata over infinite words, i.e. automata, can be used to describe the behavior of a
16
system. Also, the system properties can be described using w-automata or translated into
w-automata from other formalisms. Automatic verification can be performed using some
graph algorithms if both the checked systems and their properties are described using the
same graph representations.
One of the simplest classes of w-automata over infinite words is that of Βϋchi
automata [33]. Usually, automata have labels on their transitions rather than on their states
and have only one set of accepting states. In this work, we describe a variant, where labels
are defined on states and two sets of accepting states are given. A Bϋchi automaton is a
An execution ρ of A is a finite or infinite behavior over S, p: behavior = S such
that
• (behd p) Ε I. The first state is an initial state.
• For all i > 0, moving from the ith state in the execution to the ill st state is consistent
with the transition relation Δ, i.e., (behd(benthsuffix i ρ), behd(benthsuffix (i +1)
ρ))ΕΔ.
17
Τ at ότι Γ η) Κα Atha cat if states that appear infinitely often Αη the execution  η where
state that appears in p infinitely often. A finite execution p of a Βϋchi automaton Α is
accepting when beast ρ Ε F. A finite word of A, v = (A0 , ν ι , A2 , ... , ντ ), is accepted by Α
if and only of there exists a finite accepting execution ρ = (s0 , s 1 ... , sn ) and Ai Ε L(si)
for all Ο < i < n. A infinite word, v = (A0 , A 1 , A2 , ...) Ε K ', is accepted by Α if and only
if there exists an infinite accepting execution p such that AA Ε L(s) for all i > Ο where
sib is the element in p. The language L(A) C KW of a Bϋchi automaton Α consists
of all the words accepted by A. For the automaton in Figure 2.1 over K = {oil, β, 7}, we
have S = {so , s 1 , 8 2 }, I = {s0 }, Δ = {{s o , s 2 }, {s^, S i }, {S i , 8 2 }, {s 2 , s2 }}. An execution
must start with state so since it is the only initial node. An transition from a state to another
must follow the transition relation Δ. A word ccβ·χ is accepted by the automaton. This
is because there exists an execution sosos1s2 that accepts the word, Ε I and s 2 Ε F.
The language of the automaton in Figure 2.1 can be denoted using the regular language
expression α+βγ+ when extended to denote both finite and infinite words.
Design Oriented Verification and Evaluation(DOVE) [34] was designed by the Australian
Defense Science and Technology Organization under the direction of Tony Cant. It
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is primarily a tool for producing high-assurance system designs. It provides tools for
constructing, presenting and reasoning about formal design models. DOVE is built in layers
with a graphical user interface that is used for constructing and examine the design-models,
and an underlying layer using the theorem prover Isabelle. The graphical interface of
DOVE is written using Tcl/Tk [46] script language.
Design assurance in DOVE consists of three components: modeling, animation,
and verification. The modeling component allow users to describe real-world system in
DOVE. Animation is the activity of simulating a design model and checking its behavior.
Verification is the process of proving the design model meets its requirements. Verification
is a very effective way to provide design assurance and discover design errors.
DOVE uses a state-machine mechanism to model the specification of system
behavior. A state machine in DOVE introduces the notion of memory at each state, which is
updated by each consecutive transition which describes how to evolve the memory between
states. The state machine graph consists of nodes and edges which represent states and
transitions. There must be at least one node in the state machine and exactly one node
defined as the initial state. Each transition has three parts: Let, Guard and Act. The Let
part is used to simplify the other two parts of the transition definition. The transition is
only performed if the guard is satisfied in the current memory. The Act, referring to action,
defines how the memory is changed by the transition.
Three components are used for state machine designs. The editor provides a
graphical interface for constructing state machine designs. The transition graph of a state
machine is built by laying nodes and edges on a grid. Nodes and edges can also be moved,
modified, or deleted by user. Relations between transition edges and state nodes are also
created during the state machine design. The graph layout provided by the editor is very
useful for the user to comprehend and analyze the system design. In the animator, the user
can do certain simulations and experiments about the system. Animation in DOVE begins
by setting initial values for the heap variables, and then is carried out by clicking edges of
19
the state machine graph and calculating new values for the heap variables in accordance
with the corresponding transition definitions. This symbolic feature provides a useful way
to check whether all variables are updated as expected and whether the transition, which
is protected by the guard definition, is performed correctly. Thus, animation can be used
as a system validation tool. By using it, we can increase our confidence for the system
design. However, the animation only gives a simple assurance of correctness of the design
of the state machine. Α higher level of assurance can be gained by proving whether the
design satisfies given requirements. The prover is able to formally verify the properties
of state machine designs. Requirements of the system are expressed in a formal language,
which is designed to support the description of system behaviors. The prover checks these
properties against the system state machines. The state machine graph is used to give the
user visual feedback about the current proof state.
Verification in DOVE provides powerful facilities to express properties and to prove
the system satisfies system requirements. The system requirements must be translated from
informal natural language into a particular version of temporal logic supported by DOVE.
DOVE then provides a collection of proof rules and tactics specialized for proving these
temporal logic properties.
One of the advantages of DOVE is that it combines the ease of use provided by a
graphical user interface for describing specifications in the form of extended state machines
with the rigor of proving temporal logic properties in a robust theorem prover. We will
provide more details about DOVE in Chapter 3.
2.3 Α Introduction to Isabelle
Isabelle [36, 47, 48] is an interactive theorem prover being developed at Cambridge
University, UK, and BTU Munich, Germany. It allows mathematical formulas to be
expressed in a formal language and provides tools for proving formulas in a logical
calculus. Isabelle is used in a broad range of applications: proof of the correctness of
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computer hardware and software, properties proof of computer languages and protocols,
formalising mathematics, program development.
Isabelle is a generic theorem prover. That means it is more flexible than other similar
tools. Most other proof assistants are built around a single formal calculus. Isabelle
family embraces various logics. It represents rules as propositions and builds proofs by
combining rules. These operations constitute a meta-logic in which the object-logics
are formalized. It provides useful proof procedures for Constructive Type Theory [49],
various first-order logics [50], Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory [51], and higher-order logic of
computable functions [52]. Some logics are constructive, and some are classical. Some
are based on sets, some are on types and functions and domains. This big family is not
static. Some logics are added in, some become more mature, some are disappearing. In
this work, we use Isabelle's, which is the specialization of Isabelle for Higher-Order
Logic (HOLD) [53].
2.3.1 Higher Order Logic in Isabelle
Isabelle has a meta-logic, which is a part of higher order logic. Formulae in the meta logic
are built using only implication  >, universal quantification Λ and equality -. Other
object-logics, such as first-order logics, Zermelo-Fraenkel set theory, and higher-order
logic, are all formalized within Isabelle meta-logic.
Here we will concentrate on higher-order logic (HOLD) [54]. HOLD uses the typed
calculus [5] and functional programming [55, 56] as bases. Functions are curried by
default. The symbol % is used to represent λ-abstraction. To apply the function f of type
^l Τ2 = τ3 to two arguments a and b, we write f a b. Therefore, for example, a function
equiv to test if two natural numbers are equal can be declared as equip :: " [neat, neat] =
boil" and defined as equiv_def f : "equip a b == (a = b)" .
Isabelle logics are hierarchies of theories. The root is the Pure theory, which
implements the meta-logic. It provides all concepts and operations used in all object-logics.
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Working with Isabelle is a procedure of defining theories. Each theory is like a module that
contains types, terms, formulae, theorems, tactics, proof commands, etc. A new theory can
be defined on existing theories along with its new declarations, definitions and proofs.
The types include basic types, function types and types built using type constructors.
The type of truth values biit and the type of natural numbers neat are examples of basic
types. Function types can be presented using = , e.g. τι τ2 = τ3 . Note that the =
associates to the right. Α postbox type constructor can be used to build a new type using
existing types. For example, we can build a list of natural number by (nal)list. Α new
datatype can be defined using the form:
where C. are distinct constructor names, t is the type constructor, c are distinct type
variables and τΑ  are types.
The terms are those terms from the typed λ-calculus. They are embedded in the
syntax of object-logics. If f is a function of type Τι = τ2 and τ is a term of type τι then
f x is a term of type τ2. Terms in Isabelle's are strongly typed. If a type mismatch is
found, Isabelle will print an error message.
The formulae are terms of type biit. Formulae can be constructed from basic
constants True and False using logical connectives: Λ, V, and --i. Note that Λ, V,
and —* all associate to the right. Equality can be expressed by the infix function = of type
αα bail. In formulae x = y, x and y have to be terms of the same type. Quantifiers
are written as Ex. P and ]χ. P. Nested quantifications are written as Ex y z. P. The syntax
and grammar of HOLD are presented in Table 2.5 and Table 2.6. Isabelle HOLD combines
aspects of all the other object-logics. It is too large for us to present the whole detail of




2.3.2 Reasoning in Isabelle
Isabelle proof mechanism is based on natural deduction [57, 58]. Every goal consists of
B. Now we introduce some basic methods that Isabelle uses to work on the above goal
g. In Isabelle, theorems and inference rules all have the same syntax. The method rule
unifies B with the current subgoals, replacing it by n new subgoals,
method erule unifies B with current subgoal and unifies the first assumption Α 1 with some
assumption. The method erule deletes an assumption and replaces the subgoals with n — 1
new subgoals. The method erule is often used for elimination rules. Method drule unifies
the first assumption Α 1 with some assumption and deletes it. The subgoals is replaced by
the n — 1 subgoals of Α2i ...; Α,, and a nth subgoal with an instantiation of Β. The method
drule is usually used for destruction rules. The method frule is like drule but it will keep the
matching assumption Α 1 in the assumption list. Proofs are contracted using introduction,
elimination and other inference rules.
Introduction rules. An introduction rule can be used to introduce a logical
connective in a formula containing a specific logical symbol. For example, the disjunction
introduction rule says that if we have P or we have Q then we have P V Q. As inference
rules:
The rule introduces the disjunction symbol) in its conclusion. We are mainly dealing
with backwards proof in Isabelle. So when we apply this rule, the subgoal already has the
form of a disjunction; the proof step will make the disjunction disappear. We only need
to prove P or Q in next step. To apply an introduction rule, we simple need to use the
command rule or rule Jac, e.g., apply (rule disj11). Two disjunction introduction rules are
defined in Isabelle:
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Elimination rules. Elimination rules work in the opposite way from introduction rules.
They describe how to destruct logical symbols in a formula. For example, the conjunction
elimination rule says if we have P Λ Q and from P and Q we can conclude R, then we
have R The rule is ας fnllnwς
The rule eliminates the conjunction symbols) in its conclusion replacing it with the two
new hypotheses of P and Q separately. To apply elimination rules, we use the command
erule or erule_icic. The conjunction elimination rule is defined in Isabelle as:
In Isabelle, there are also some other kinds of rules: destruction, unification and
substitution, quantifiers, etc. Some basic Inference rules in HOLD are listed in Table 2.7,
Table 2.8 and Table 2.9
Table 2.7 The HOLD Rules.
Table 2.8 Derived Rules for HOLD.
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Table 2.9 More Derived Rules for HOLD.
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2.3.3 Isabelle System and Interface
Isabelle is implemented in ML [55]. The standard user interface is shell-based. But Isabelle
also provide a friendly Emacs-based Proof General [59] interface. We used the Proof
General interface in this work.
Isabelle is an interactive theorem prover. Thus, unlike automatic theorem provers,
Isabelle is directed by the user during a proof. After starting a goal, the user directs Isabelle
by some operations on the goal, called tactics at each step. Isabelle provides various kinds
of tactics for rewriting, simplification, resolution, assumption, induction and so on. By
using the tactics, the user tries to solve the goal. Tactics may lead to subgoals. After
solving all the subgoals, the user has a formal proof of the goal. Once a theorem has been
proved it becomes a derived rule of inference for use with tactics in proving new theorems.
Isabelle provides good notational support. New notations can be introduced using
normal mathematical symbols. Proofs can be written in a structured notation based upon
traditional proof style, or more straightforwardly as sequences of commands. Definitions
and proofs may include TeX source, from which Isabelle can automatically generate typeset
documents.
Isabelle has also proven useful for doing large proofs, having many tools that allow
the automation of difficult and tedious details. Thus it is particularly suitable for embedding
other formalisms and developing verification systems.
CHAPTER 3
TECHNIQUES
This chapter presents our main approaches. We start with a description of system modeling
and verification in DOVE and the method to address the state explosion problem. In the
second part, we will talk about a formulation of Linear Temporal Logic in Isabelle [60].
Finally, we describe the automatic verification framework and an application using our
approaches.
3.1 System Modeling and Verification in DOVE
The DOVE tool is used to provide support for high-level system modeling, design,
and formal reasoning about state machine design for computer-based systems. We will
introduce safety properties [61] verification using DOVE and discuss how DOVE is
extended with product automata [ 18].
3.1.1 Safety Properties Verification using DOVE
DOVE comprises three main components: the graphical editor for drawing state machines
as specifications of systems, the animator for exploring various execution paths, and a
prover, built on Isabelle, for verifying temporal logic properties of state machines.
State machine definitions have two parts: a topology or state transition diagram part
and a transition definition part. The presence of a transition between two states in the
diagram indicates the possibility that the state machine may undergo a transition between
them. The definition of the transition determines if, and how, such a transition can occur.
The Edit Mode is used to specify state machine designs by providing the means for laying
out the state transition graph of a machine; declaring types, constants, variables and inputs;
defining the associated transitions; and checking occurrences of variables, e.g. variables
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declared and not used, or identifiers used and not declared. The ability to model a system
using the graphical editor substantially speeds up the process and increases the confidence
level, when compared to describing the system as expressions in a language.
The Animation Mode is used to observe how variables and terms evolve during
execution of the state machine. The basis of animation is the animation path, which is
a path in the transition graph of the machine. Animations are carried out using the graph by
selecting a final or initial node, proceeding through intermediate edges via back substitution
or forward animation and finishing at some initial or final state. The ability to explore
sample executions through animation helps the user to deepen his understanding of the
state machine and to do a limited degree of testing. The highest degree of assurance is
provided by stating and proving the needed properties of the system using the prover.
Proof Mode provides the means for defining, editing and browsing machine properties,
including a check of the consistency of properties with different versions of machine
specifications, and interactively proving a property. Once a state machine definition has
been saved, all its transitions are translated into definitions in Isabelle automatically and a
proof can be commenced.
In DOVE, only safety properties can be checked. A safety property asserts the
absence of undesirable states, i.e., no bad things happened so far. For this reason,
the behaviour of the state machine is interpreted finite sequences of configurations. A
past fashion temporal logic is used as the language of system properties. The syntax of the
temporal logic is defined datatypes of temporal formulae as follows:
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The stated and transition are the Isabelle types of states and transitions. The
input and heaped are the types of various input variables and heap variables. Then the
overall configuration type is then defined to be the cross product of the four component
types.
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3.1.2 Formal Definitions of Automata and Products
Before introducing the method to extend DOVE, we will give a formal definition in higher-
order logic of the type of the extended state automata used in DOVE, their semantics of
execution, and how we extend this with product automata.
Extended State Machines Informally, an extended state machine (or automaton) is a
duple of a set of states, a set of labeled transitions, and an initial state. In DOVE, the states
are augmented with memory when executed. A transition is a directed edge between a pair
of states coupled with a guarded action to be committed when that transition is executed.
The transition may be executed only in the case that the guard holds in the memory of
the originating state of the transition, and in which case the action yields the memory of
the terminating state. Memory is an association of values to variables. The guards are
expressed as propositions over the variables in the memory, and the actions are expressed
as assignments of values to those variables.
This notion for state machine is similar to those discussed in the literature, and a
typical example can be found in Chapter 4 of [62]. One way in which DOVE extends this
notion is by separating the variables into two categories, which in DOVE are referred to as
input variables and heap variables. Input variables are read-only in that no transition may
alter their values. Their values are considered to be supplied by the environment. As such,
when defining an execution, we must assume that their values may change at any point
during a sequence of transitions. While this is manifest in the proof rules in Isabelle for
proving temporal formulas for state machines defined in DOVE, it is a subtle point which
complicates the definition of an execution and warrants highlighting.
When users define a state machine in DOVE, they do so using a graphical user
interface. This is used to generate a description in Isabelle of the extended state machine
and properties that the user wishes to prove. This description of the extended state machines
in Isabelle is a shallow embedding in the sense that the variables of the extended state
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machine are modeled as variables of Isabelle, as opposed to introducing a separate syntax
for variables. Such a lightweight embedding is advantageous when the goal is exclusively
proving properties in the model. However, it limits the ability to express meta-properties
in the logic, such as stating what an extended state machine is, or what the product of two
extended state machines is. Therefore, in this section, we will adopt a deeper embedding.
The definition we will give has been rendered in higher-order logic. However, as in the
informal description above, it is desirable to express things using set-theoretic notation. In
all formal definitions below, such set-theoretic notations should be interpreted as using a
standard rendering of naive set theory in higher-order logic, such as one given by sets as
predicates.
In attempting to formally define what an extended state machine is, we have to decide
how to represent the writable variables versus the read-only variables. Our ultimate goal
is to define a product for composing automata, and in such a composition variables which
may be read-only in one component may need to be writable in some other. Therefore, we
will represent these two classes of variables as disjoint subsets of a single type of variables.
For our purposes, the precise type used for representing variables does not matter, so we
will use a type variable for this, allowing it later to be specialized to integers or strings or
perhaps some other complex structures. Having made this choice, we will need to be able to
express the requirement on transitions that they only involve the variables associated with
the particular extended state machine. We will capture this notion of restricted dependence
by the following definitions:
That is, two functions are the same on given domain if they have the same values on all
elements of that domain.
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Α function on functions only depends on a subset s if it always returns the same value
when applied to functions that are the same on s. The motivation for this definition is that
our memories are functions assigning values to variables, but the guards and actions are
only allowed to depend on that part of the memory that corresponds to the writable and
read-only variables.
Α transition is well-formed with respect to a set of writable variables and a set of
read-only variables provided that the guard depends only on the union of the writable and
the read-only variables, the action depends only on the writable variables, and the action
does not assign any new values to the non-writable variables.
We are now in a position to give a formal definition of an extended state machine:
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Α duple of states, transitions, writable variables, read-only variables, initial state, and initial
condition is a state machine if
• the writable variables and the read-only variables are disjoint,
• the transitions are well-formed with respect to the writable and read-only variables,
• the start and end states of each transition are among the states of the machine,
• transitions with the same label have the same guarded actions,
• the initial state is one of the states of the machine,
• the initial condition only depends on the writable variables.
Execution Up to now we have defined what it means to be an extended state machine;
we have in effect described its syntax. We are still left with describing how to execute an
extended state machine; that is we are left with describing its semantics. The semantics
of an extended state machine is the set of all it executions. So what is an execution?
Informally, it is a sequence of moves through the state machine starting from a memory that
satisfies the initial condition of the state machine, and then follows consecutive transitions.
More formally, an execution is a pair of an initial memory and a sequence of pairs of
transitions and resulting memories, where the start state of each transition is the end state
of the previous transition. However, this is not a complete description. We need to be more
precise about what we mean by resulting memories and enabled by the previous memory.
DOVE is only capable of dealing with properties that are provable in finite time
(safety properties), so we will use lists for sequences. It would not be fundamentally
different if we extended to both finite and infinite sequences.
For the sake of readability, we shall make a couple of short definitions.
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The last state in a list of pairs of labeled transitions and memories is the initial state if the
list is empty, and otherwise is the end state of the transition at the head of the list.
(Iast_memory initial_memory [] = initial_memory) Λ
The last memory in a list of pairs of labeled transitions and memories is the initial memory
(for the intended execution) if the list is empty, and otherwise is the memory at the head of
the list.
An execution in an extended state machine starting from an initial memory is a list of
pairs of labeled transitions from the extended state machine and memories such that either
the list is empty or
• the tail of the list is an execution
• the last state of the tail of the execution is the start state of the next transition
• the guard is enabled in some memory that is the same as the previous end memory
on the writable variables (we allow the read-only variables to change) and in that
memory we execute the action to acquire the new memory.
executions (statues, transitions, writable_vars, read_only_vars,
initial_state, initial_cinditiin) initial_memory con f fig_list =
ίs_esm(states, transitions, writable_vars, read_only_vars,
initial _states, initial_cinditiin) Λ
initial_condition initial_memory Λ
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We do not intend to go into the details of the particular temporal logic used in DOVE
in this work, but briefly a state machine is said to satisfy a given temporal logic formula
provided every sequence of memories derived from the executions of the state machine
satisfies the formula.
Product Automata Having defined the syntax and semantics of extended state machines,
we are in a position to give the definition of the product of two state machines. Using the
labels on the transitions, our product will allow synchronization of transitions having the
same label. The states of the product is the subset of the product of the states that occurs
in the set of transitions of the product (together with the product of the two initial states,
if it is not already there). The transitions are effectively the merging of those transitions
from the two automata that have the same label, pinioned with the remaining transitions
lifted to the product states. The writable variables are just the union of each set of writable
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variables. The readable variables are the union of each set of readable variables, minus any
that are in the union of the writable variables. The variables that are in the intersection of
the union of the writable variables and the union of the readable variables are those that
are communicating values between the automata. The initial state is just the product of the
two original initial states, and the initial condition is the intersection of the original initial
conditions.
Τ 'f t1-"  of ι try 	 fι'ι'c hρΡ i1- 0 ctorf cfQf , ιιιi itch ρΡr1ι^inπΡ Qt1t
The product is defined as
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It follows from this definition that the product of two extended state machines is again an
extended state machine, provided their writable variables are disjoint. Note that if the
writable variables of the first automaton are disjoint from the second automaton, then
ιι 1 o a2 = a2 o al(for all a l and a2 in the definition of the transitions in the product
automaton above). Therefore, the product of two automata in one order is isomorphic
to the product in the other order.
Given an execution sequence, we can project that execution sequence to an execution
sequences of each of the component automata.
We can prove that if a given initial memory and sequence of transition-memory
pairs is an execution of the product automaton, then the same initial memory together
with the projection of that sequence is an execution of the corresponding component
automaton. Therefore, for every sequence of memories derived from an execution in the
product automaton, there exists an almost identical sequence of memories derivable from
a sequence in the component automaton. (The original sequence may have additional
memories that are the same as their immediate predecessors in the sequence on the
writable variables of the component automaton.) Therefore, for an appropriate class of
temporal logic formulae (those that only involve the writable variables of the component
automaton, and are stuttering invariant), if a formula holds of the component automaton,
it automatically also holds of the product automaton. It is our hope in future work on this
system to be able to incorporate into DOVE an ability to automatically transfer appropriate
theorems from component automata to the corresponding product automata.
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3.1.3 Extending DOVE with Products
In the previous section we described the mathematics of the product of two automata.
In this section we will discuss our method of implementing the construction of product
automata as an extension to DOVE. Our current approach is to add an external tool that can
parse files produced by DOVE, analyze the contents of those files to determine the details
of the component automata to be composed, construct the product automaton, determine
layout information for it, and finally output all this information into a new file that can be
input into DOVE.
In the course of a DOVE session, various local files are created, such as an smg file,
a thy file, an kw file, etc. The smg file, which stands for state machine graph file (for
example, plugin.smg), contains all of the information required to describe the extended
state machine. This file includes not only the construction and layout information about
the state machine graph, but also the information to define variables, state conditions and
transitions between states.
An smg file is a sequence of lines, each beginning with a keyword, followed by data
relevant to the item being added. Firstly, the smg file gives some preferences for the display
of the state machine. The global variable grid tells us the canvas is gridded by being set
to 1, and not gridded by being set to 0. The variable SetGridSize says the size of the grid.
The nodes in the smg file are defined using the keyword file RestoreNode followed
by the node number, node coordinates and node name. For example, in the plugin state
machine graph file, we define theWait state by
The node number of Wait is 0 and it is located at (20.0, 10.0). The edges in the plugin
smg file are created by the keyword RestoreEdge followed by the edge number, the number
of the starting node, the number of the ending node, their directions, some coordinates it
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travels through, and the location of the label and its name. For example, the edge Plugin in
the plugging smg file is defined as follows:
In this example, its edge number is 0, it comes out from the north of the node 0 and
goes into the south of node 1, its label, Plugin, is at (20.0, 13.0), and it travels through the
path of [(20.0, 11.0), (20.0, 12.0), (20.0, 13.0), (20.0, 14.0), (20.0, 15.0)].
The smg file gives two kinds of variables: heap variables and input variables. The
heap variables are defined using the keyword dvd_def. It is followed by information about
their names, types, status and some comments on them. Also we define input variables by
dtr_defs followed by the same information as the heap variables.
As for the definition of the transitions, the smg file use dtr_defs. It gives a list of
all the transitions followed by details of individual transitions. These details include the
comments, status and the content of the transitions. The content of a transition has guard
and act definitions in it.
The smg file also should have an initial state which is defined by the variable
di_startState. The initial condition is given by setting the variable di_predicate. Moreover,
we can add some comments on the initial state by di_description.
In addition, the smg file contains some optional information about the extended state
machine. For example, if the state machine has been checked and there are no syntax errors,
the variable dchksmgChecked is set to be 0, otherwise it equals 1.
From all the information above, we already know enough information to construct
the state machine. Any modifications of the smg file will directly change the state machine
in DOVE. By creating a new smg file, we can generate a new extended state machine
without starting up the DOVE. We can construct the extended state machine which is the
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composition of more than one component in one model without the need to interact with
DOVE.
Using the above information, we parse the smg files of component automata to extract
information to reconstruct the automata. From this, we build the product automaton. For
this, we follow quite closely the mathematical description given in the previous section.
The code was written in SML [55], a functional programming language similar to the typed
lambda calculus. SML data types and functions are used to compute the constructions
previously given as mathematical formulas. After constructing the product, we still need to
generate layout information before we can generate a smg file to add the product automaton
to DOVE.
In DOVE, layout information is generated from interactions with the user. The user
places nodes at various locations on the drawing canvas and draws edges between the
various nodes, indicating curvature by the path of the mouse. The layouts may be altered
by clicking and dragging the various entities to be changed. DOVE does some work to
generate a decent presentation of the graph, but the basic layout information comes from the
user. When we automatically generate the product automata, we must also automatically
generate some positioning for the components; to make the user generate this information
would be almost tantamount to making the user create the product in the first place. To
generate this information, we make use of the graph visualization tool dot [63]. Dot is
applied to a file that lists the nodes and edges of a directed graph, together with any desired
labeling of the nodes and edges, and the desired shape (and color) of the nodes. For each
node, dot adds the size (height and width) of the circle and the position of its center. Each
edge is extended with path information, consisting of the position and direction of the
terminating arrowhead follow by a sequence of coordinates that the edge will pass through,
and the coordinates of the left edge of the label.
We must parse the information returned from dot and combine it with the non-
graphical information for the product automaton. Also, the graphical information produced
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by dot is not completely suitable for directly inputting into an smg file. We need to
perform scaling, and better layouts seem to be given by thinning the points for layout of the
transitions. Once we adjust the information from dot and combine it with the non-graphical
information, we can finally produce an smg file that describes the product automaton to
DOVE. Once this file exists, the user can start up DOVE with it, and proceed to state and
prove properties about it.
We began this project because we were attempting to use DOVE to reason about a
medium-sized real-world safety-critical system. This system could be naturally decomposed
into a hierarchy of subsystems communicating through limited interfaces of input and output
variables. In attempting to use DOVE, we found ourselves attempting to compose these
subsystems by hand. The work described above outlines a way to build the interactive
components into one extended state machine by extending DOVE with product automata.
By using the information we get from parsing the smg file in DOVE, we can create a new
state machine graph externally without have to use DOVE to create it interactively.
With future extensions of this tool, we should be able to reason about the various
components and then have those results automatically carried over to the product when the
product is formed or its theory is subsequently updated.
3.1.4 Applications
The example given below is intended to monitor the behavior of another device. This
example consists of two components: a component for monitoring, whether the device is
plugged in and receiving adequate power, and a component for monitoring when the device
is adequately powered, whether it is producing values within an acceptable range.
Figure 3.1 shows a screen snapshot of the DOVE canvas for the Plugln Monitor
component of the system. The gridded canvas is the DOVE state machine window which is
used for designing the machine. The three nodes representing the three states in the Plugln
Monitor model are Wait, CheckPlugin and CheckUnplug. The edges with appropriate
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labels are transitions between these states. Several variables are needed. The heap variable
Pluggedln represents whether the machine is plugged in. The input variable Volt is supplied
by the environment and is monitored to trace when the device is properly plugged in.
Finally, an initial state Wait should be defined in which the machine is unplugged.
The system checks whether the device is plugged in before going from the Wait to
the CheckPlugIn mode. We have the variable Volt as the guard for the three transitions:
Plugin, Unplug and Plugin. At each transition, if the guard conditions are meet, the
corresponding transition will be taken, and the variables will be updated. In the initial
state, if the device is plugged in and receiving a voltage greater than 10 volts, the transition
Plugln will be taken and Pluggedln will be set to true. The plug monitor will stay in the
CheckPlugin state unless the voltage drops below 10 volts. In that case, it will enter the
CheckUnplug state and Pluggedln will be updated to false. Once the device is unplugged
in and receiving more than 10 volts, it will reenter the CheckPlugin state. The monitor
will keep running in this loop infinitely. Here, the Plugin Monitor is correctly and clearly
modeled in DOVE.
Now we can formally prove some safety properties of the Plugin Monitor using the
DOVE Property Manager. One important requirement of the Plugin Monitor is that if the
value of Volt is dropped under 10 then the variable Pluggedln is set to be false. Verification
in DOVE corresponds to proving that all executions of a state machine satisfy a certain
property. This property can be represented using the turnstile (" -") operator. For example,
the above property can be written as,
The basic idea of proof in DOVE is to use induction on the execution of the state
machine. Suppose the initial state satisfies the property and every transition of the state
machine also preserves the property, then the property holds for all executions on the state
machine.
Figure 3.1 Α simple plug monitor in DOVE.
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Figure 3.2 shows the DOVE Prover. We proved the above property by three steps,
Topology, BackSubstitute and MasterBlast.
However, the Plugln Monitor is just a simple example of modeling a system. Life
is not always so easy. When dealing with a bigger project in which some models
interact with each other, some problems come up. The Value monitor is a component in
which the variable Value shows the status of the value variable. The state machine
of Value Monitor is showed as Figure 3.3. The three states Wait, CheckValueOk and
CheckValueFault are defined in the Value Monitor state machine. Six transitions connect
these states and update variables if the guard of the transition is satisfied.
In the initial state of Wait, once the variable Pluggedln becomes true, the variable
Value will be set to true. The device will enter the CheckValueOk state. This can
happen in one of two ways. When the system being monitored first starts up, the Plugln
Monitor and the Value Monitor synchronize on beginning to monitor it's state. Thereafter,
if the power drops below a certain threshold, then the Value Monitor returns to its Wait
state, and reenters CheckValueOk when it detects that the Plugln Monitor has determined
that the power has returned to an acceptable level. Once in the CheckValueOk state, if the
input variable Test is shown to be below 5, Value is set to false, the device will enter
the CheckValueFault state. If variable Test is set back to greater than 5, Value is set
back to true, and the CheckValueOk state will be reentered. In both CheckValueOk and
CheckValueFault states, if the device is unplugged, the device will go back to initial Wait
state.
Between these two models, the Value Monitor uses the Pluggedln variable, which is
written by the Plugln Monitor, as an input variable. Unfortunately, with the current DOVE
tools, these two interactive components could not be composed into one single model. In
order to conquer this, we need to extend DOVE with product automata.
Figure 3.2 Property Proof in DOVE.
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Figure 3.3 A Monitor for Checking Values in DOVE.
We have started the DOVE with the product state machine graph file produced from
the Plugln and Value Monitor components. Figure 3.4 shows a screen snapshot of DOVE
with the product in editing mode.
Now we can prove some properties concerning both the Plugln and Value monitors
in the product automaton. In the Value monitor, the variable Value is set to be true if and
only if the value of Pluggedln is true and the value of Value is greater than or equal to 5
in the previous state. The value of Pluggedln is set to be true if the value of Volt is greater
than or equal to 10 in the previous state. For example, we have the following property:
- Previously ((Previously Volt=12) And Value)) — Value = True
We state the temporal property in the DOVE proof manager and graphic prover as in
Figure 4.1. By using topology, the property is split into cases uniquely determined by the
graph information from the graph. Figure 3.6 shows the result after using topology tactic.
The tactic topology produces 16 subgoals. They clearly describe what are the
previous states, what must be true in each previous state in order to get the current state,
Figure 3.4 Product of Plugln and Value Monitor.
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Figure 3.5 Property Proof in DOVE Prover.
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Figure 3.6 Result of Topology in DOVE Prover.
and what is needed to be proved in current state. We use DIVE'S back-substitute to
replace occurrences of variable names in the corresponding temporal Sequent with the values
assigned to them by the last transition. Finally, tactic MasterBlast can be used to prove the
subsoil for the initial state. Then the temporal property is proved as shown in Figure 3.7.
Figure 3.7 Finished Proof.
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3.2 Formulating LTL in Isabelle
Work on embedding temporal logics has been done by Agerhoim and Skjodt [64], Clarke
and Emerson [65], and Schneider and Hoffmann [66]. In this chapter, we present a formal
formulation of linear temporal logic (LTL) in the lsabelle theorem prover. The syntax and
semantics of LTL are formally defined. Also, the axioms and proof rules are provided for
the complete axiomatization of LTL. Later in this chapter, we introduces how LTL is used
for system specifications [67, 68, 69].
3.2.1 Embedding LTL in Isabelle
In this work, LTL is built on propositional logic [70]. We chose Isabelle Higher-Order
Logic as the object logic to build the embedding of LTL since HOLD is a well developed
logic with many tools and extensions built on it.
We use the facilities in the Isabelle system for embedding different logics to present
a formulation of LTL. Isabelle has also proved useful for doing large proofs, having many
tools that allow the automation of difficult and tedious details. Thus it is particularly
suitable for both implementing LTL as well as actually using it to develop proofs in LTL.
ln Chapter 2, we already gave the syntax and semantics definition of LTL. This
embedding of LTL in Isabelle is very close to the syntax and semantics we gave in Chapter
2 with one bit of expansion. We add the logical atoms true and false. These are logically
equivalent to the propositions True and False. However, by separating them out, the
algorithm is capable of producing a smaller automaton when these LTL versions of true and
false are used instead of the propositions True and False. As a concession to efficiency,
we have added these two atoms in to the lsabelle definition of LTL formulae. To capture
normal form LTL formulae, we have defined in lsabelle the following datatype:
datatype α lt! = ltl_True
Base "α propsi"
Until "α lt" "α lt"




Release "α lt" "α lt"
And "α lt" "α lt"
Weak_Next "α lt"
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where α props = α = boil.
The modalities Ενentually::(α ltl=ο lt1), Always::(α ltl=α lt1), /ΙΙ_Νοt::(α ltΙ= c
lt1), and Imply(— )::([αα lt1, α lt1] =c lt1) are defined as syntactic sugar.
Eventually φ 	= Until ltl_True φ
Always φ 	 = Relapse ltLFalse φ
ltl_Not ltl_True	 = ltLFalse
ltl_Not ltl_False = ltl_True
ltl_Not (Base φ) = Neg φ
ltl_Not (Neg φ) = Base φ
φ - ψ	= Or (ltl_Not φ) ψ)
The semantics of LTL formula are given using the satisfiability predicate:
_ 	 _ :: (α) behavior 	 α lt1 = boil
The notation ξ 	 φ means that a behavior ξ satisfies the LTL formula φ. Thus, for
each behavior ξ we have ξ 	 ltl_True. Also, we observe that φ —k ψ if and only if
ξ ψ,andξ ψif andonlyifξ φΡ—^ ψαηdξ In
addition to the equations we give in Chapter 2, we also have (φ V ψ) = -n(( -Ι φΡ) Λ (-ίψ)),
(φ —> ψ) _ (-,φα) V ψ, ❑φ = -ι(ρ(-Ίφ)). Parentheses can often be omitted by defining
priority on logical connectives. Priority for operators in LTL are, by descending order,
0, 0, Ο, ❑ , U, V. The operator U is associate to right, e.g., ιρ U Ψ UΦ _ (φ(ΨΦ)).
The operator V is associate to left, e.g., Φ V Ψ V Φ = (( V Ψ) V ψ). Some examples of
LTL formulae and their meaning are listed below:
These theorems are the basis of a sound and complete relative to a complete system
for propositional logic. The soundness of a system assure that only correct assertions can
be proved. It is proved by showing all the theorems can be proved from our definitions. Α
system is called complete if it is capable to prove all correct formula that can be expressed
using the system. These theorems can be used as the basis of a proof system. They are
not proved here because we are not providing a formal proof system here. However, the
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following is a list of theorems derivable from Al — A9 and the rule for implication without
resorting back to the definition of =:
3
.2.3 ιο system ιυννΝιJJιιlιιιαιιυll υ ιιgA L
Specifying the system itself and specifying its properties are different activities. Although,
the system and its properties can be given with same formalism, automata, for example. In
many cases, they are expressed by different formalisms. The system can be described using
transition systems or automata. The system modeling was addressed in part in DOVE and
is not closely related to our work here. The system properties, on the other hand, can be
given in a logical formalism. In our work, we choose LTL as such a formalism because
the simple formalism of LTL is surprisingly powerful when specifying properties of inter
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leaving sequences and modeling the execution of a program. As we mentioned in Chapter
2, Linear Temporal Logic has been deemed expressive enough for most purposes [72],
while retaining a relatively simple syntax and semantics.
Let P be a system that admits multiple executions. Such a system can be described
using a transition system or an automaton. Each execution of P is represented by a
behavior, which is a finite or infinite sequence of states. Let Γ be a set of behaviors
generated for the system P and φ be any LTL formulae. If all the behaviors of system
P satisfies φ, we write P cp. If not all the behaviors of system P satisfies φ, then we
write P φ. Notice that P 1 φ does not mean P — φ; sometimes when P (70, some
of behaviors do satisfy gyp.
We are particularly interested in two kinds of system properties: safety properties
[73] and liveness properties [74, 75]. Safety properties asserts the absence of undesirable
states during a certain time. In another words, nothing bad will happen, e.g. a television
system will not shut off itself without a user pressing the power off button. Likeness
properties assert some desirable state will eventually be reached. Unlike safety properties,
liveness properties require something good will happen, e.g. the television will change the
channel if a user pushes the change channel button.
In our work, one of the reason we interpret LTL on behaviors instead of only finite
sequences is that both safety properties and liveness properties can be easily expressed.
3.3 Formalizing the Translation of LTL Formulae to Bauchi Automata
The algorithm for translating LTL formulae into Bϋchi Automata is widely used in model
checking field. In this work, we present a formulation of the translation algorithm from
Berth et al. [35]. The translation algorithm has been improved by Daniel and Giunchiglia
and Mardi [76], Schneider and Hoffmann [66], Couvreur [77], Bastin and Oddoux [78],
Giannakopoulou and Lerda [79], Somenzi and Bloom [80], and Thirioux [81].
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3.3.1 Translating LTL into Bauchi Automata
In this section, we present our algorithm for translating an LTL formula μ into an automaton
that accepts exactly all words satisfying μ. We modify the algorithm presented in [35] by
Berth eta!. and [82] by Gunter and Pealed. The algorithm in [35] can only produce automata
that accept infinite words. The algorithm in [82] can only output automata that accept
finite words. We merger these two algorithms to a new version that can produce automata
that accept both finite and infinite words. We also use a variation of Bϋchi Automata we
introduced in Chapter 2, B = (K, S, Δ, I, L, Fset, F). The new version of automata is
defined by us to accept both finite and infinite words.
The algorithm takes an LTL formula φ as input and constructs a graph with states and
transitions as the output automaton. The algorithm decomposes the formula φ according
to its boolean structure and temporal operators. The following data structure is used by the
algorithm as a graph node for the generated automaton B:
Name. A unique identifier of the node.
Incoming. A set of the identifiers of nodes with edges that point to the current
node.
New. A set of subformulae of φ that must hold at the current node and have
not been processed yet.
Old. A set of subformulae of φ that must hold at the current node and have
already been processed.
Next. A set of subformulae of φ that must hold at every immediate successors
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of the current state.
Strong. Α flag showing whether the current node must not be the last one in
the sequence.
The Strong field is originally introduced in [82] by Gunter and Pealed to indicate when
the current state cannot be the last one in the sequence. We also keep a set Nodes_Set of
nodes, each having the same fields above. The set Nodes^Set is initially empty and will
contain all the nodes we need to build the automaton once the algorithm terminates.
The main idea of the algorithm is to separate the LTL formulas into two parts: one
that holds in the current state, and the other that holds in the next state, using:
Several small functions used by the algorithm are defined. The function newname()
generates a new unique name for each new created node. The functions New], New,
Next are defined in Table 3.1:
Table 3.1 Functions for Splitting LTL Formulae.
where β ranges over basic propositions and φ and ψ range over LTL formulae. Another
function max_SF is defined based on the function SF. Given a set of LTL formulae A,
max_SF returns a single formula φ from A such that for all ψ in A, the cardinally of SF φ
is less than or equal to the cardinally of SF ψ.
The algorithm for translating an LTL formula into a generalized Bitch automata [83]
is presented in Figure 3.8. To translate the LTL formula μ, the algorithm starts with a single
node (line 42-45) that has a single incoming edge from a dummy special node knit. The
new field of the node contains the formula μ and has empty old and next fields. And the
result set Nodes_Set is initialized to be empty.
The algorithm works recursively. For the current node s, the algorithm checks if
there are formulae to be processed in the field New in s (line 4). If the field New is
empty, then the node is completely processed. We need to check if it should be adds to the
Nodes_Set. If there is a node r in Nodes_Set what has the same formulae as s in its Old
and Next fields and has the same Strong field (lines 5-6), then we do not need to add s into
Nodes^Set. Instead, the set of Incoming of s are added to the Incoming of r (line 7). If there
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is no such node r in Nodes _Set, then s is added to Nodes_Set and a new node s' is created
(lines 9-11). A fresh name is given to s'. The Incoming field of s' contains the name of s.
The Next field of s is the New field of s'. Also the Old and Next fields of s' are initialized
to be empty.
On the other hand, if the field New is not empty, we use the function maxSF to
select a formula η in New and remove it from New. In the original Berth algorithm, and
in the Gunter-Peled algorithm, the choice of the formula η is non-determinism. In our
algorithm, we use the function maxSF to eliminate the non-determinism by choosing the
maximal formula η instead of choosing an arbitrary formula because this is helpful for us
to prove the termination of the algorithm later on.
If η is a literal and ιη in Old, then the current node is discarded since it contains a
contradiction(lines 16-17). Otherwise, η is added to Old, if it is not already there.
If η is not a literal, s is processed according to the outmost operator of η as follows:
7
are added to the New of s'. Both Strong fields of s 1 and s 2 are set to be
String's).
The fiction create_graph is the start of the whole translation algorithm. creategraph
takes an LTL formula μ as input and calls the expand fiction. The first argument of the
expand is a node with μ in its New field, knit in its Incoming field. The Old and Next fields
of the node are set to be empty. The second argument of expand is an empty node set.
The above description of the algorithm for translating an LTL formula into a Bϋchi
automaton is imperative, in keeping with the spirit of the algorithm presented by Bertha et al.
in [35]. In order to reason about this algorithm in Isabelle it was necessary to functionalism
it. In place of updates to fields of existing nodes, we have to create new elements. ln
place of updating the Incoming filed of existing nodes in Nodes Set, we must create a new
Nodes Set with the node to be "updated" removed and a new node with increased Incoming
field added. Similarly, the functions such as newname upon which expand depends must
also be fictionalized.
Once the algorithm terminates, we can convert the set of nodes Nodes_Set into a
• The alphabet Σ consists of sets of sets of negated and non-negated propositions that
appear in the translated formula φ.
• The set of states S consists of the nodes in Nodes Set.
3.3.2 Termination Proof of the Algorithm
The algorithm of Bertha et al. [35] has been used for many tools in pracme, e.g., the model
checker SPIN [84]. However, a formal proof the termination of the algorithm does not exist
in the literature. It's critical that a verification algorithm itself to be proved to be correct.
The termination is a fundamental requirement for the correctness of the algorithm. Thus,
here we propose a method to define the algorithm in a generic theorem prover, Isabelle and
give the formal proof of the termination.
The translation algorithm works recursively. Proving termination of a recursive
algorithm can be achieved by finding a well-founded relation R on the inputs to the function
and showing that the recursive calls decrease under the relation R [85, 86].
Each total recursive function defined in Isabelle must specify a well-founded relation
to justify the termination of the function. Formally, the relation - is well-founded if it
admits no infinite descending chains
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Isabelle provides theorems for constructing a well-founded relation. We use a way to
specify a measure function f into the natural numbers, where
However, in the translation algorithm, there is no obvious single well-foided relation on
the arguments to the algorithm such that the argument decreases for every recursive call.
In each recursive call, not all the arguments are necessarily decreasing under the usual
measures.
To find a useful well-founded relation, we observe that, at the outermost level, we do
two different kinds of recursive calls. The first kind of recursive call will add a new node
to Nodes .Set and start processing Next as New. The second kind of recursive call is when
there are formulae in New, and the recursive call is made to a new node structure where one
of the formulae in New has been broken up.
In the first case, the remaining nodes we can create from the original formula is
decreasing, although not strictly. The nodes in Nodes_Set are uniquely determined by their
Old and Next components. The New field must be empty. We never put two different nodes
with the same Old and Next into Nodes Set, but instead merge their Incoming fields, and
throw away one of the names. So the calculation of the number of nodes that are already in
Nodes Set can be simplified to the calculation of the number of elements in the set:
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The fiction SFset is used to calculate the set of subformulae that a set of formulae can
create. When a node q is updated into a new version q', then the following holds:
These two equations can be proven directly from the algorithm and the definition of
LPL. Thus, when we insert a node into Nodes_Set, the subformula in the Old and Next are
all from the original formula. The translation process does not create new formulae.
From the above we see that there is an upper bound for the number of nodes left to be
created by the current node that can be inserted into Nodes_Set. Also, the number of nodes
we are creating is increasing, although not strictly at each step. Moreover, the number of
possible nodes to create is boided, so every time we insert a node into Nodes_Set, the
distance to the upper boid is decreasing. The following relation remainnodes can be
used to calculate the distance:
The function card is the cardinally function for finite sets.
However, the remainnodes fiction does not decrease strictly during every
reclusive call. This makes it difficult to use it as a well-founded relation to prove
termination. Now we consider what is happening when the distance to the boid stays
constant. The second kind of recursive call will not insert a node into Nodes_Set. It will
repeatedly break up New by selecting a formula in New using the function maxSF itil
it is empty. In this case, the complexity of New is decreasing. For defining the complexity
of New, we use the function maxSF to select a maximal subformulae, one that is not a
subformulae of any other. Then when we remove it from New and put it into Old. The total
number of subformulae in New will go down by at least 1. The relation complex_new is
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Το combine these two relations to work together, we use the lexicographic product
(<*Rex*>) of two well-foided relations. Given relations rag and rb, the lexicographic
product is formally defined as follows:
The lexicographic product decreases if either its first component decreases or its first
component stays the same and the second component decreases. It is also proved that
if two given relations are well-foided, their lexicographic product is also well-foided.
The following relation is built to serve as the total well-founded relation to prove the
termination of the translation algorithm:
Isabelle's less_than is defined as a relation, which is a set of pairs of natural
numbers, i.e., ((i, y) Ε less_than) = (x < y). The mv_image is used to generalismd the
This relation is defined in Isabelle and its well-foundedness is proved by Isabelle
classical reasoner. The termination of the algorithm is also proved in Isabelle by case
analysis. We do the case analysis on whether the New field of the input node is empty first.
If it is empty, we prove that after the algorithm inserts a node into Nodes et, the remaining
nodes it can create that can be inserted into Nodes Set has decreased. In the case that the
input New field is not empty, we do a case analysis on what the maximal formula in the
New field is. The complexity of the New field is proved to be decreasing. This termination
proof is carried out in an interactive fashion in Isabelle. In our case, the termination of the
66
algorithm can not be proved by an automated theorem prover. This is because the measure
function we derived here is not syntactically suggested from the function definition. There
can not exist an algorithm that can prove or disprove the termination of a fiction by only
given the recursive definition of a general recursive function. It is generally impossible to
always compute the necessary induction principle to prove a theorem. Some attempts to
do so are generally driven by syntax. This falls in the scope of what inductive theorem
provers [87, 88]. In parmular, it is beyond what rippling can do.
3.3.3 Correctness Proof of the Algorithm
In this section, we present a formal correctness proof of the LTL to Bϋchi Automata
translation algorithm. An informal proof has essentially already been given by Berth et
al. in [35], but we feel that the level of proof discourse in that work is at a high enough
level with enough details omitted that the proof would benefit from the intense scrutiny
afforded by a formal proof within a theorem prover such as Isabelle. Formalizing their
proof poses new challenges. Several lemmas about the expand fiction are claimed to be
true "by construction". Particularly given that expand is a rather complex general recursive
function, it is not clear what it means for a fact about it to be true "by construction". In
our proof, these results follow as corollaries of results proved by induction, and that the
inductive results have a general assume-guarantee nature to them: if a fact holds of the
state (or that portion of the input representing the state) before the function is executed,
then it will hold of the resulting state after the execution. Also, since we extended their
algorithm for accepting finite words, we need to provide the proof for finite case.
In the algorithm for translating LTL formulae into BLichi Automata, we first use the
fiction creategraph to get a set of nodes Nodes^Set from an LTL formula η. Then
we translate the Nodes^Set into a Bϋchi Automata. The algorithm in Figure 3.8 works
recursively. The fiction expand is actually doing two things. If the New field is not
empty, expand splits the node into two or refines it into a new version. If the New field is
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empty, expand insert the node into Nodes^Set and start with a new node. Thus, to prove
the correctness of the algorithm, we can break the fiction expand into two fictions:
splits and grow. The modified algorithm is shown in Figure 3.9. The recursive function
splits takes a node s as input and repeated splits or refines node. The output of splits is a
list of nodes that are split or refined (line 6-10) from the original node s. If the New field
of the s is empty, then splits returns an empty list(line 4). The input of the fiction grow
is a list of nodes, which usually are the result of splits , and a set of nodes Νοdes_Set . The
fiction grow checks the node at the head of the node list against ΝοdesSet (line 46-48).
If there exists a node in Nodes Set that has the same Old and Next fields, then grow only
updates the Incoming field of that node and goes on process the tail of the node list(line
49). If there is no such node in Νοdes_Set, then grow inserts the node into Νοdes^Set
and starts with a new node, where the new New field is set to be the old Next field(line
50-52). The function get_graph is simply the start of the algorithm with the LTL formula
μ. The fiction get_graph starts with a LTL formula μ and calls the splits and grow. The
arguments of splits are initially set to be an node which contains μ in its New field and knit
in its Incoming field. The arguments of grow are set to be the result of grow and an empty
Νοdes_Set .
Theorem 3.1 guarantees the modification of the algorithm will not change the result.
Thus, the correctness proof of creategraph can be reduced to the correctness proof of
get_graph.
Theorem 3.1 Given the same LTL formula η, the two functions creategraph and
get_graph will produce the same result.
Proof: To prove two fictions are the same, we prove that if they are given the same
LTL formula η as input, then they produce the same result. To show this, we show that
if a node s is in the output node set of creategraph, it is also in the output node set of
getgraph, and vice versa. This can be proved by induction on both fictions. ■
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Now, we can prove the correctness of the algorithm by proving the modified
algorithm using get_graph. The theorem 3.2 is the main goal we want to prove:
Theorem 3.2 The automaton A constructed by the algorithm from an LTL formula μ
accepts exactly the behaviors that satisfy μ.
Proof. Lemma 3.6 and Lemma 3.12 prove this theorem in two directions.	 ■
ln what follows, let ξ be a behavior consisting of propositions, and let σ be a behavior
consisting states of A, the automaton that is constructed from an LTL formula μ. If the node
n is a member of node list returned by splits), then we say n is a terminal descendant of
s and s is an ancestor of n. Also, let ΕΞ denote the conjunction of a set of formulae
the conjunction of the empty set is set to be True. A fiction max_SF selects a maximal
formula from a set of formulae, which is not a formula of any other formulae.
Lemma 3.1 If New (s) is not empty, then for all nodes n, where n is a terminal descendant
of s, we have max_SF(New (s)) Ε Old (n).
Proof ln the definition of the splits, every recursive call on a node s will remove the
max_SF(New(s)) from New field and add it to Old field(line 6). When a node s is split into
s 1 and sl(line 12-28), max_SF(New(s)) is inserted into both Old(sl and Old(sl). When a
node s is refined to sl(line 8-11 and 29-40), max_SF(New(s)) is also inserted into Old(sll).
Also, we notice that the Old field oned grows. Once some formula is added into Old field,
it will never get out. There is no operation to remove formula from the Old field in the
fiction splits. If we start with splits), max_SF(New(s)) goes to the Old field and stays
there till the end of fiction splits. Thus, by induction we have for all nodes n in splits),
max_SF(New(s)) Ε Old (n). ■
Lemma 3.2 For all n, where n is a terminal descendant of s, if there are no two nodes with
both the same Old and Next fields in Nodes_ Set, then there exists one and only one node
r in grow(splits(s), Nodes_Set)) such that Incoming(n)Clncoming(r), Old(n)=Old(r) and
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Next(n)=Next(r). Moreover, for all r Ε grow(splits(s), Nodes_Set)) such that Incomings)
C Incoming), either r is in Nodes_Set, or there exists a terminal descendant n of s such
that Incoming(n)Clncoming(r), Old(n)=Old(r) and Next(n)=Next(r).
Proof By induction on the fiction grow. If the input node list is not empty, the
function grow checks the node n at the head of the node list against the nodes in the
Nodes_Set. If there is a node r in Nodes_Set with the same Old and Next fields, then r
satisfies the conclusion. This is because once a node is added into Node_Set, we can only
update its Incoming field. We can not change its Old and Next fields or remove it from
Nodes_Set. If there is no such node in Nodes_Set with the same Old and Next fields, then
n is inserted into Nodes_Set and n will be the node to satisfy the conclusion. The reason is
same as the first case. Every node n in the input node list will eventually be checked against
the Node_Set. Thus, there exists one and only one node r in grow(splits(s), Nodes_Set))
Also, there are two ways that a node r can be in grow(splits(s), Nodes_Set)). First,
it is already in Node_Set, then there will be a node with the same Old and Next fields in
the final Node_Set. We already proved this above. Second, it is added into Node_Set in line
52. This is the only point where a node can be added into Node_Set. And once added into
Node_Set, there will be a node in the final Node_Set with same Old and Next fields for the
reason above. ■
Lemma 3.2 describes the relationship between the result of the fiction Splits and
the node set Node_Set, which is very useful for connecting the original input LPL formulae
and the final output Node_Set. Also, a very important property about Node_Set is given. If
the input Node_Set does not have two nodes with the same New field and Old field, then
there are no such pair of nodes in the output Nodes_Set. This is the basis of several lemmas
we proved below.
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Proof. A node of an automaton can be an initial state if and only if it has knit in
its Incoming field. One fact about the splits fiction is that splits does not change the
Incoming field when splitting and refining nodes, i.e., all terminal descendants have the
same Incoming field with their ancestor. This is because from the definition of the function
splits, we know that splits never add or remove to Incoming field of any nodes. From
Lemma 3.1, if we start from the initial node s = [Name = new_nameO, Incoming =
, then every nodes that is in the result
node list of splits) has knit in its Incoming field and μ in its Old field. Also, the result of
splits) contains all the nodes that can have knit in it since every call to grow will change
the Incoming fields. From Lemma 3.2, for all terminal descendants n of s, there is one and
only one corresponding node in the grow(splits(s), {}) with the same Old and Next fields
and knit in its Incoming field. For all nodes in grow(splits(s), {}) with knit in its Incoming
field, there exists a terminal descendant n of s that has knit in its Incoming field and has the
same Old and Next fields since we started with an empty Node_Set. There is a one-to-one
relationship between all terminal descendants n of s and all nodes r in grow(splits(s), {})
for Incοming(n)Clncοming(r), Old(n)=Old(r) and Next(n)=Next(r). Thus, for every initial
state q Ε I of an automaton constructed from the LTL formula μ, we have μ Ε Old(q). •
Lemma 3.4 Let σ be an execution that is accepted by A, which is constructed from an LTL
formula μ. Let σ, denote behd(benthsuff^x i σ), the itch state in the execution, and let σο be
the initial state and η be an LTL formula in Old(σο). Then, by case analysis on η, one of
the following holds:
72
Proof Note that cases ltl_True and Beg φ are similar with the Base case. LPL formula
ltl_False can not be in Old field since the algorithm will terminate once a formula ltl_False
is met. This lemma can be proved by the induction. We only provide the proof for Until
case. Other cases can be proved similarly and were done in the Isabelle proof.
When the algorithm is processing a formula n= U spline 6), the node is split into
two nodes. For the first copy, φ is inserted into the New field and ςο U ψis inserted into
the Next field. For the second copy, ψ is inserted into the New field. The formula Αρ U Ψis
inserted to the Old field of both copies. We also know that φ and ψ will eventually go to
their own Old field. This can be proved by induction on the function splits. If our path goes
to the second copy, then the conclusion
Old(σ; ) will be satisfied by choosing j=0. If our path goes to the first copy, we have φ and
ςο Uψin theOldfield. When t is node is fuled processed, the algorithm starts with a new
node. The New field of the new node is set to be the old Next field, which contains U 0 in
it. The algorithm repeats this procedure if we always choose the path to the first copy until
the second copy is chosen sometime later. Since the execution σ satisfies the acceptance
conditions of the automaton A, there must exists some state that has ψ in its Old field.
■
The fiction BEis_singleton is used to test if a sequence is a singleton. If a sequence
σ is infinite, then BEis_singleton) is set to be false.
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Lemma 3.5 Let σ be an execution of A constructed from an LTL formula μ and σ denote
behd(benthsujix i σ), the i trs state in the execution. Let η be an LTL formula in Old(σj.
Proof By induction on ψ. The base case is for formulae of the form p, where p is
a proposition. The base case can be proved directly from the construction. We will only
show the Until induction case. According to Lemma 3.4, we have j > 0. EA < i <
Other cases are treated similarly. 	 ■
Corollary 3.1 Let σ be an execution of constructed from an LTL formula μ and σ0 be the
initial state. Let ξ be a word that is accepted by σ. Then for all LTL formula ψ in 01d(σ 0),
ξ ψ.
Proof: By Lemma 3.5 and set i to be 0. 	 ■
Lemma 3.6 Let σ be an execution of the automaton A constructed from the LTL formula
Proof Let qo be an initial state of σ. From Lemma 3.3, we have μ Ε Old(qo). From
Lemma Corollary 3.1 we have for all LTL formula ψ in Old(qo ), ξ ψ. Thus, we have
Lemma 3.7 For all nodes n in an automaton A constructed from an LTL formula μ,
Strongman) is uniquely determined the its Old field.
Proof Initially, the construction starts with a node s containing μ in its New field.
The Strong field indicates the current node must not be the last state in a sequence, i.e.,
there is something that needs to happen and has not yet happened so far. Only two forms of
LTL formulae force something to happen in the future states. One is Until, the other is Next.
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The Strongmans) field is set to be true oned for these two cases and the String's) field is set
to be false if and only if either there exists φΡ  Ε Olds) or there exists ΟφΡUΨΕ Olds),
but ψ Olds). If an LTL formula ΟφΡUψis met during the construction(line 12),φ UΨ
is inserted into both Old fields and φΡ is inserted into the New field. We already proved that.
will eventually go to the Old fields. Note that there is no operation to change the Strong
field back to false. Once the Strong field of a node is set to be true, it will always be true.
If an LTL formula Οφ  is met during the construction(line 33), Οφ  is inserted into the Old
field. Thus, there are oned two cases for the Strong field of a node n in an automaton A to
be true. The first is that n contains an LTL formula of form ΟφΡUψin itsOldfields. The
second is that n contains an LTL formula of form φΡ  in its Old field. ■
Lemma 3.7 guarantees there is no two nodes in an automaton Α constructed from an
LTL formula μ that have some Old and Next field but have different Strong field. Thus, we
only need to check the Old and Next fields in line 47.
Α fiction VarNext is defined to choose Next or Weaki'Jext according to the Strong
field of a node. If the Strong field is true, we choose Next, otherwise we choose WeaklVext.
The function VarNext is defined as follow:
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Lemma 3.8 guarantees every recursive call preserve conjunction of the formulae
among New, Old and Next fields. No new formulae will be added in or removed from New,
Old and Next fields.
Proof Let Nodes_Set = grow(splits(q),{}). From Lemma 3.2, we knοω that for each
qj , there will be a corresponding node in Νοdes_Set with the same Old and Next field and
all nodes in Nodes _Set are coming from the result of splits. The result of splits can be used
as nodes in Νοdes_Set if only Old and Next field are concerned. Thus, using Lemma 3.8,
this lemma can be proved by induction on the construction. If a node qi contains U Ψ in
its Old field, then there are two cases, either qi has Εφ in its Old field, or Ai has ψ in its Old
in the Old field, it is chosen as the maximal formula sometime before(line
was inserted into Old field, the node is split into two-line 12-20), one has
^^^ ^^J ι γ Old and the other has ψ in its New field. We also knοω that formulae in New
field will eventually go to the Old field. Thus, if a node qi contains U ψ in its Old field,
then there are two cases, either A i has ιρ in its Old field, or qi has ψ in its Old field. And if
ξ ψ, we only have the second case, where ψ in the Old field. ■
Proof In the construction, when a node q is finished and inserted into Node^Set(line
50-52), a new node ql is created with New(qll) = Next(q). We know that (benthsu f fix 1 ξ)
New(qll). Once ql is fully processed, New(qll) goes to Old(qll). This can be proved
by induction. Using Lemma 3.9, we can get (benthsu f f i
(VarNext Strongly) Ε Neatly)). Lemma 3.9 also guarantees there is a q' that will
satisfies the acceptance conditions. For the finite case, if' is a singleton, then q is the last
node in the execution. If ξ is not a singleton, this case can be proved similarly with the
infinite case. And eventualed, there will be node ql that either there is not formula in its Old
field has Until form or for each formula U ψ Ε Oldlyll) with ξ ψ, ψ is also in Old(qll).
■
Lemma 3.11 can be used to find the successor during the construction of an execution
in lemma 3.12. In the infinite sequence case, it guarantees the existence of the successor.
In finite case, it guarantees the existence of the successor or the completion of the
construction.
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constructed satisfies the acceptance conditions for both finite and infinite words. ■
Now we will give an example to illustrate how proof is formally done in Isabelle.
We will only give one proof because there is no enough space to present all proofs for
these lemmas. Lemma 3.5 indicate that if σ is an execution of A constructed from an LTL
formula μ and σ denote behd(benthsuffix i σ), the itch state in the execution. And let  σ be
the itch state in σ and η be an LTL formula in Old-σ i ). Then, for all i, -benthsuffix i σ) η.
This lemma is formally stated in Isabelle as follow:
The function ns2ba is defined to translate the result of get_graphma1 into a Bϋchi
automaton. The function accept_exec_beh takes a Bϋchi automaton, an execution, and a
word as arguments. If the execution is accepted by the Bϋchi automaton and accepts the
word, then accept_exec_beh returns true. Otherwise it will return false. To prove lemma
run_wοrd_cοmpatible, we do an induction on η. The base case is for formulae of form
ltl_True, ltl_False, Base p, and Beg p. We give an example proof for case Base p here. The
proof script is shown in Table 3.2. The case of form Κο U ψ can be defined as:
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Lemma unt i 1 _c ompa t i b 1 e is proved using the fact stated in Lemma 3.4. We
are not providing the proof script because of the space constraint. All lemmas for the
correctness proof of the algorithm have been defined and formally proved in Isabelle.





In this work, we have enhanced verification techniques based on novel combinations of
theorem proving and model checking. Our contribution includes an extension of DOME
with product automata and their application, formulation of LTL in Isabelle, and formal
proof of correctness of the algorithm for translating LTL formulae into Βϋchi Automata.
The work extending of DOME gained us a lot of experiences for doing the verification
on real-life problems. We studied the formal verification tool DOME, learned its strengths
and weaknesses, and extended it with product automata to reduce the burden of the state
explosion problem for the designer.
The formulation of the algorithm for translating LTL formulae into Bϋchi Automata
in a formal logic earned us a chance to experience the formal proof of a nontrivial
algorithm. During the proof, we learned the length of the proof, the mathemamal theories
needed, the level of expertise in the theorem prover required, and the time required to
carry out such a proof. Our formulation of the algorithm and its correctness proof result
more than 9,500 lines of Isabelle code. One lesson is that formal algorithm proof requires
nontrivial human expertise and time. We also nomed the difference between the formal
and informal proof, doing proof with the theorem prover Isabelle forces us to be honest
in our arguments. Informal proof such as, "obvious", "directly from", and "immediately
from" do not work. We learned that some trivial claims in the informal proof are actually
nontrivial.
The main contribution of this dissertation is the improvement of the easy of use
and reliability of tools for formal verification. We have increased the automation of an
interactive tool while giving mathematical justification for it. We have increased the
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confidence level in a class of model checkers by formaled verifying one of the core
algorithms use by them. And we have increased automation in the domain of fully
expansive interactive proof and we have increased the confidence level of fuled automated
tools by subjecting one of their central algorithms to the rigor of fully expansive proof.
4.2 Related Work
As is well known, verification techniques based on automata theory and temporal logic
always draw a lot of attentions.
DOME [34] is tool to provide support for the formal analysis of state machine designs.
In DOME, the modelling and reasoning activities can be driven directly from the state
machine in a graphical framework. Merification in DOME is carried out by doing inductive
proofs over automata instead of model checking. DOME can oned deal with finite sequences
and can only handle safety properties. The algorithm is embedded in the theorem prover as
a family of tactics. In DOME, the correctness is guaranteed one example at a time, by its
embedding in Isabelle.
The translation algorithm we modified was presented in the Berth et al. [35]. They
described a tableau-based algorithm for obtaining an automaton from a linear temporal
logic formula. The algorithm is to be used in model checking in an "on-the-fly" fashion.
That means the automaton can be constructed simultaneously along with the generation of
the model. The algorithm can be used to check the validity of the linear temporal logic
properties by only constructing part of the model and part of the automaton. However, the
algorithm can oned be used to translate temporal logic interpreted on infinite sequences.
In our work, the algorithm is enriched with the ability to work on both finite and infinite
sequences by defining linear temporal logic on a special sequence behavior. Also, we
provided a formal proof of the termination of the algorithm, which is a crucial part of the
correctness of a recursive algorithm.
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Combining mechanical theorem proving and model checking has been a hot topic
in recent years. Several other related works draw attention. In the Chou [ 14], they
formaled verified a meta-theory of model checking using mechanical theorem proving.
Ha case study is carried out using the mechanical theorem prover HOLD to verify the
correctness of a partial-order reduction technique for reducing the state search performed
by model checkers. There is a lot of similar infrastructure in our work and their proof
work. Moreover, their experience with verifying nontrivial algorithms in HOLD helped us to
employ our proof in Isabelle.
Model checking for temporal logic properties can give counter examples if the
properties fail to hold for the checked system. The counter example will be used as a
certificate of system failure. On the other hand, if the check succeeds, no such certificate
will be given. In the Namjoshi [89], they gave a deductive proof of the reason why
the model checking is successful. They created a deductive proof system for verifying
branching time properties expressed in the μ-calculus and showed how to generate a proof
in the system from a successful model checking ri. Basically, we are all aiming to prove
that the algorithm is correct. While their work is side-stepping whether the algorithm is
always correct by having it generate a proof that it is correct in each specific example.
In [82], Gunter and Pealed suggested a new application for temporal logic, as a way
of assisting the debugging of a concurrent or sequential program. They defined temporal
logic over finite sequences as the specification formalism for the automatic verification of
extended state systems. Halso, they described a debugging tool based on the idea which can
be used for finding paths to assisting in building test suites and hence be more confident
about the correctness of the system. In that paper, they describe a variant of the algorithm in
Berth et al. that applies to LPL formulae interpreted over finite sequences. Our work in this
paper merges the two algorithms. The algorithm here has ability for handling both infinite
and finite sequences of program behaviors and has nontrivial proof about the termination
of the algorithm while both of these features are absent in that work.
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4.3 Future Work
So far, in previous chapters, we presented some techniques for formal specification and
verification. Our ultimate goal is to create a tool for automatic verification. In this section,
we present some possible future works. We will introduce the automata framework for
building an environment in Isabelle for model checking LTL specifications, i.e., checking
whether a modeled system presented as Βϋchi automata satisfies a given LTL specification.
The automata theorem framework was proposed by Kurshan [90], Mardis and Wolper [91],
and Halpern and Scheider [92].
Has we mentioned in Chapter 2, one of the advantages of using automata is that both
a modeled system and its specification can be presented in the same way. We use Βϋchi
This means all accepted word of A are allowed by B. If the intersection is empty, the
system model A satisfies the specification B. If the intersection is not empty, elements in it
are counterexamples [93]. Checking for the emptiness of the language obtained from two
automata is simpler than checking for language inclusion.
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However, if the specification automaton is translated from an LTL formula  φ, we can
translate the negation of the formula φ into an automaton B directly rather than translate φ
into an automaton B and then complement it.
Han important property of Bϋchi automata is their closure under intersection, union
and complementation [62]. This means that there exists an automaton that accepts exactly
the intersection or the union of the language of two given automata, or the complementation
language of a given automaton. These properties enable us to do some constructions on
automata without lose any information.
We give the following formal description of the automatic verification method. Given
the system automaton A and specification expressed using LTL formula φ: First, we need
to normalism the LTL formula -ίιρ. Then we need to translate normal form φ into a
generalized Bϋchi automaton B, and then convert the generalismd B'iichi automaton into a
simple Bϋchi automaton B. Next, we also need to build the product automaton A x B and
check the emptiness of A x B. If the intersection is empty, the specification holds for A. If
the intersection is not empty, any elements in it are counterexamples.
APPENDIX A
PROGRAMS
This appendix include programs in Isabelle and the SAL programming language. We put
out programs in: http : / /ωωω- f Faculty . Bs . uiuB . edu/—egunter instead of here
because of the space constraint.
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